Markets and hierarchies in early modern tax systems: A principal-agent analysis.

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  • Author(s): Kiser, Edgar
  • Source:
    Politics & Society. Sep94, Vol. 22 Issue 3, p284. 32p.
  • Document Type:
    Article
  • Additional Information
    • Subject Terms:
    • Abstract:
      Determines which form of tax collection rulers will use. Outline of answers to the question of tax collection form to be used by rulers; Analysis of rational choice models focusing on transaction costs; Use of a principal-agent model of relations between rulers and their agents; Variations in types of agency relations for different types of taxes, in different countries, over time.
    • ISSN:
      0032-3292
    • Accession Number:
      10.1177/0032329294022003003
    • Accession Number:
      9409213764
  • Citations
    • ABNT:
      KISER, E. Markets and hierarchies in early modern tax systems: A principal-agent analysis. Politics & Society, [s. l.], v. 22, n. 3, p. 284, 1994. DOI 10.1177/0032329294022003003. Disponível em: http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=hch&AN=9409213764. Acesso em: 26 nov. 2020.
    • AMA:
      Kiser E. Markets and hierarchies in early modern tax systems: A principal-agent analysis. Politics & Society. 1994;22(3):284. doi:10.1177/0032329294022003003
    • APA:
      Kiser, E. (1994). Markets and hierarchies in early modern tax systems: A principal-agent analysis. Politics & Society, 22(3), 284. https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329294022003003
    • Chicago/Turabian: Author-Date:
      Kiser, Edgar. 1994. “Markets and Hierarchies in Early Modern Tax Systems: A Principal-Agent Analysis.” Politics & Society 22 (3): 284. doi:10.1177/0032329294022003003.
    • Harvard:
      Kiser, E. (1994) ‘Markets and hierarchies in early modern tax systems: A principal-agent analysis’, Politics & Society, 22(3), p. 284. doi: 10.1177/0032329294022003003.
    • Harvard: Australian:
      Kiser, E 1994, ‘Markets and hierarchies in early modern tax systems: A principal-agent analysis’, Politics & Society, vol. 22, no. 3, p. 284, viewed 26 November 2020, .
    • MLA:
      Kiser, Edgar. “Markets and Hierarchies in Early Modern Tax Systems: A Principal-Agent Analysis.” Politics & Society, vol. 22, no. 3, Sept. 1994, p. 284. EBSCOhost, doi:10.1177/0032329294022003003.
    • Chicago/Turabian: Humanities:
      Kiser, Edgar. “Markets and Hierarchies in Early Modern Tax Systems: A Principal-Agent Analysis.” Politics & Society 22, no. 3 (September 1994): 284. doi:10.1177/0032329294022003003.
    • Vancouver/ICMJE:
      Kiser E. Markets and hierarchies in early modern tax systems: A principal-agent analysis. Politics & Society [Internet]. 1994 Sep [cited 2020 Nov 26];22(3):284. Available from: http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=hch&AN=9409213764