Guns, butter, and debt.

Item request has been placed! ×
Item request cannot be made. ×
loading   Processing Request
  • Author(s): DiGiuseppe, Matthew
  • Source:
    Journal of Peace Research. Sep2015, Vol. 52 Issue 5, p680-693. 14p.
  • Additional Information
    • Subject Terms:
    • Abstract:
      I argue that favorable access to sovereign credit provides governments with greater autonomy to invest in security by allowing political incumbents to relax fixed-budget constraints. Borrowing permits leaders to delay and minimize the macroeconomic and redistributive costs associated with domestic sources of finance. Consequently, leaders of creditworthy states face fewer political costs when increasing military expenditure in response to growing demand or maintaining military expenditure when government revenues fall. A cross-sectional time-series analysis supports two observable implications of the argument. First, creditworthiness is positively associated with military spending with an effect on par with regime type. Second, creditworthiness conditions the effect of external threats on military expenditure, suggesting that poor credit terms constrain the provision of security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
    • Abstract:
      Copyright of Journal of Peace Research is the property of Sage Publications, Ltd. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)