Democratic Inefficiency? Regime Type and Suboptimal Choices in International Politics

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  • Additional Information
    • Publication Information:
      SAGE Publications, 2012.
    • Publication Date:
      2012
    • Abstract:
      This article examines the relationship between regime type and decision makers' tendency to make suboptimal choices in international crises. To test hypotheses on the optimality of democratic foreign policy, the author uses a novel statistical measure of suboptimality in foreign policy behavior. This estimator builds on Signorino's statistical strategic models to allow for actor-level variation in deviations from optimal behavior in a strategic setting. An analysis of the international disputes from 1919 to 1999 shows that democratic leaders have a greater tendency to choose policies not optimal for their citizens than do nondemocratic leaders.
    • ISSN:
      00220027
      15528766
    • Accession Number:
      10.1177/0022002712445737
    • Rights:
      Copyright © 2012 SAGE Publications
    • Accession Number:
      edsjsr.23414711
  • Citations
    • ABNT:
      MUHAMMET A. BAS. Democratic Inefficiency? Regime Type and Suboptimal Choices in International Politics. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, [s. l.], v. 56, n. 5, p. 799–824, 2012. DOI 10.1177/0022002712445737. Disponível em: http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsjsr&AN=edsjsr.23414711. Acesso em: 4 dez. 2020.
    • AMA:
      Muhammet A. Bas. Democratic Inefficiency? Regime Type and Suboptimal Choices in International Politics. The Journal of Conflict Resolution. 2012;56(5):799-824. doi:10.1177/0022002712445737
    • APA:
      Muhammet A. Bas. (2012). Democratic Inefficiency? Regime Type and Suboptimal Choices in International Politics. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 56(5), 799–824. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002712445737
    • Chicago/Turabian: Author-Date:
      Muhammet A. Bas. 2012. “Democratic Inefficiency? Regime Type and Suboptimal Choices in International Politics.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 56 (5): 799–824. doi:10.1177/0022002712445737.
    • Harvard:
      Muhammet A. Bas (2012) ‘Democratic Inefficiency? Regime Type and Suboptimal Choices in International Politics’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 56(5), pp. 799–824. doi: 10.1177/0022002712445737.
    • Harvard: Australian:
      Muhammet A. Bas 2012, ‘Democratic Inefficiency? Regime Type and Suboptimal Choices in International Politics’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 56, no. 5, pp. 799–824, viewed 4 December 2020, .
    • MLA:
      Muhammet A. Bas. “Democratic Inefficiency? Regime Type and Suboptimal Choices in International Politics.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 56, no. 5, Oct. 2012, pp. 799–824. EBSCOhost, doi:10.1177/0022002712445737.
    • Chicago/Turabian: Humanities:
      Muhammet A. Bas. “Democratic Inefficiency? Regime Type and Suboptimal Choices in International Politics.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 56, no. 5 (October 1, 2012): 799–824. doi:10.1177/0022002712445737.
    • Vancouver/ICMJE:
      Muhammet A. Bas. Democratic Inefficiency? Regime Type and Suboptimal Choices in International Politics. The Journal of Conflict Resolution [Internet]. 2012 Oct 1 [cited 2020 Dec 4];56(5):799–824. Available from: http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsjsr&AN=edsjsr.23414711